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On July 16, 1992, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") took a ma-
jor step toward implementing what has come to be
known as "video dialtone" by greatly expanding the
role telephone companies ("telcos") play in transmit-
ting video services to their customers.' The Video
Dialtone Decision is part of an extensive examina-
tion of the cable-telco cross-ownership rule,2 which
prohibits telcos from providing video programming
and owning cable systems within their telephone ser-
vice areas. Combined with a 1991 Commission deci-
sion,' the Video Dialtone Decision allows telcos to
construct video dialtone systems without obtaining a
cable franchise from local authorities. It also permits
them to own up to five percent of a video program-
mer. The Video Dialtone Decision allows telcos to
enter into financing arrangements, joint ventures and
management or consulting agreements with a video
dialtone programmer or a cable system which shares
construction of the video dialtone infrastructure.
Under the Decision the FCC claimed jurisdiction
over rates charged to video dialtone customers and
voted to recommend that Congress eliminate the
video programming prohibition contained in the
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Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership
Rules, Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress
and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 7 FCC
Rcd. 5781 (1992) [hereinafter Video Dialtone Decision].
2 47 C.F.R. § 63.54 (1992).
Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership
Rules, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, First Report
and Order, and Second Further Notice of Inquiry, 7 FCC Rcd.
300 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 Decision], review petitions dock-
Communications Act of 1934 ("Communications
Act" or "Act").4
Describing a "typical" video dialtone system is
problematic because the FCC has established only
general requirements for video dialtone. Telco pro-
grammers and consumer groups have differing views
of video dialtone and its capabilities. In other words,
the concept of video dialtone is similar to the concept
of "family values"- it means different things to dif-
ferent people. Understanding video dialtone, there-
fore, requires a little imagination. The video dialtone
issue itself has become convoluted, involving the
FCC, Congress and the courts.
This Article examines the latest FCC pronounce-
ment on video dialtone, with an eye toward con-
fronting the various legal, political and practical is-
sues surrounding this new concept. This Article will
first present the varying views on video dialtone. It
will then address the regulatory framework behind
the concept, and the distinctions between video di-
altone, cable and traditional common carrier struc-
tures. Next, the Article reviews the FCC's recom-
mendations to Congress regarding video dialtone and
the impact the Cable Act of 1992 will have on video
eted sub nom. National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, No. 91-
1649 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 26, 1991); Community Antenna Tel-
evision Ass'n v. FCC, No. 91-1656 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 31,
1991). Both NCTA and CATA again filed petitions for review
(dockets 92-1529 and 92-1538, respectively) after the FCC ruled
on various petitions for reconsideration. See Telephone Com-
pany-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 7 FCC Rcd. 5069
(1992) [hereinafter Reconsideration Order].
' Communications Act of 1934, as amended, § 613(b)(1), 47
U.S.C. § 533(b)(1) (1988). This section makes it unlawful for a
Title II common carrier to "provide video programming directly
to subscribers in its telephone service area, either directly or in-
directly through an affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled
by, or under common control with the common carrier." Id.
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dialtone. After addressing the specifics of telcos pro-
viding video service to rural areas and FCC preemp-
tion of state regulatory authority over video dialtone,
the Article concludes there is much to be accom-
plished before video dialtone becomes a reality.
WHAT IS VIDEO DIALTONE?
Video dialtone has been described as "an enriched
version of video common carriage under which [tele-
phone companies] will offer various non-program-
ming services in addition to the underlying video
transport." 5 In essence, television sets would be used
to connect video dialtone subscribers with video ser-
vices providers in much the same way telephones are
used for aural and data communication. A converter
box or similar device would allow subscribers to dial
up video services, via a menu, access code or some
other gateway. In addition to traditional one-way
video services (e.g., broadcast and cable program-
ming), two-way video is a possibility with video di-
altone. Thus, picturephones should become a reality.
A video dialtone system could also transport non-
video services such as voice and data.
Video dialtone is envisioned as a provider of sev-
eral highly innovative services. Most of the proposed
services involve viewer interaction, whereby viewers
actually select information or services through the
system by way of specialized equipment in the home.
One such service is a video catalogue which would
allow subscribers to select a product from a direc-
tory, request specific information about the product
and view video demonstrations of the product. An-
other possibility is an electronic video newspaper
which would allow subscribers to read about an
event (e.g., a speech or a baseball game) and then
view video clips of the action. Subscribers might also
be able to view a program or sporting event and
choose their own camera angles.
But the service which has gained the most atten-
tion is video-on-demand, whereby a subscriber could
access a program in its entirety, at any time. This
concept differs from current pay-per-view cable ser-
vices in that video-on-demand subscribers would not
have to wait until the next scheduled showing of the
program in order to gain access. The program would
5 1991 Decision, supra note 3, para. 10.
In re Applications of Telephone Companies for Section
214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated
Community Antenna Television Systems, Final Report and Or-
der, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970), reconsidered in part, 22 F.C.C.2d
746 (1970), afld sub nom. General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v.
United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
theoretically be available instantaneously. For exam-
ple, a two-hour movie might be shown on pay-per-
view at two-, four-, and six o'clock. Someone want-
ing to watch it at 4:37 would have to wait eighty-
three minutes until the next showing. With video-
on-demand, however, the viewer could call the ser-
vice at 4:37 and start viewing the movie immediately.
The practical difference between video dialtone
and traditional cable television systems would be in
the manner of choice. Instead of selecting from those
services that the cable operator chooses to carry,
video dialtone subscribers would be able to pick from
among the service providers who connect to the video
dialtone system. Advocates of video dialtone see this
as leading to increased choices for consumers because
cable systems have limited channel capacity, and a
cable operator's decisions regarding which services to
carry are often based on other factors, such as
whether the operator has a financial interest in a
particular service or program.
REGULATORY BACKGROUND
One concern in implementing video dialtone has
been the FCC's cable-telco cross-ownership rules,
which have barred telephone companies from provid-
ing cable service to their telephone subscribers since
1970.8 The ban was primarily the result of Commis-
sion fears that telcos would use their control over
pole and conduit space to extend their telephone mo-
nopolies to the nascent cable industry, thereby creat-
ing a strangle hold on local information distribu-
tion.' Specifically, the Commission determined that
telcos must provide pole and conduit space to non-
affiliated cable operators. And, because the Commis-
sion found the likelihood of telco monopolization of
local cable markets so great, it completely banned
telcos from providing cable service within their tele-
phone service areas, "except where no practical al-
ternative exists to make such service available within
a particular community."18 The FCC has granted
several such "good cause" waivers through the years,
most notably in 1988 in Cerritos, California.'
The cross-ownership prohibition was codified at
section 613(b)(1) of the Communications Act by the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("1984
' 21 F.C.C.2d para. 46.
8 Id. para. 48.
In re General Tel. Co. of Cal., Memorandum Opinion,
Order and Certificate, 3 FCC Rcd. 2317 (1988), rev'd by Mem-
orandum Opinion, Order, and Authorization, 4 FCC Rcd. 5693
(1989), remanded sub nom. National Cable Television Ass'n v.
FCC, 914 F.2d 285 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Cable Act").1" However, the 1984 Cable Act went
further than the Commission's previous decision,
banning telco provision of cable services by prohibit-
ing telcos from providing any video programming in
their telephone service areas. Video programming is
defined as "programming provided by, or generally
considered comparable to programming provided by,
a television broadcast station."'" The result of this
language was to bar a telco not only from providing
cable service, but also from providing any video pro-
gramming that was transmitted to a telco's subscrib-
ers, either directly or through an affiliate owned or
controlled by the telco. 2 Telcos were prohibited
from "providing channels of communications or pole
line conduit space" to an affiliated entity in order to
provide video programming within their telephone
service area. 3 However, nothing prohibited telcos
from constructing the facilities and leasing them to a
nonaffiliated cable operator in what is called a
"lease-back" arrangement.' 4
During the 1980s there was tremendous growth in
the cable industry, due largely to satellite technology
and in part to Congress' goal of encouraging the
young cable industry. At the outset of the decade,
there were 4,225 cable systems in the United States,
serving 15.2 million subscribers.' By 1988, the
number of cable systems had nearly doubled to
8,000, and subscribership nearly tripled to forty-five
million.' 6 In addition, the cable industry was becom-
ing more concentrated. By 1990, the combined sub-
scribership of two multiple system operators
("MSO")1' 7-TCI and Time Warner-accounted
for almost thirty-four percent of the nation's cable
subscribers.' 8 The top ten MSOs claimed 61.79 per-
cent of all subscribers.' This increased concentration
existed in tandem with vertical integration between
MSOs and cable programmers. By the end of the
decade, MSOs held equity interests in thirteen of the
top twenty national basic cable services and six of
the eight national pay cable services.20 New services
10 Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (1984).
47 U.S.C. § 522(16).
12 Id. § 533(b)(1) (1988).
13 Id. § 522(b)(2) (1988).
14 See Final Report and Order, supra note 6, para. 49.
19 NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFO. ADMIN. RE-
PORT 88-223. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VIDEO PROGRAM
DISTRIBUTION AND CABLE TELEVISION: CURRENT POLICY IS-
SUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 10 (1988) [hereinafter NTIA
REPORT].
16 Id.
"7 An MSO is a company operating more than one cable
system. FCC, COMMUNICATIONS: A GLOSSARY OF COMMUNI-
CATIONS TERMS 12 (Aug. 1991).
were more likely to be vertically integrated. Sixty-
four percent of the cable programming services
launched since passage of the 1984 Cable Act were
vertically integrated with MSOs, compared to only
thirty-eight percent of those begun before 1984.21
Many local cable operators became firmly en-
trenched monopolists, capable of preventing nonaf-
filiated programmers from reaching cable subscribers
and precluding their few existing multichannel ser-
vices competitors from carrying some of the more
popular cable programming.
By the end of the decade, it was quite clear that
cable was no longer an industry in need of protec-
tion. In fact, the late 1980s precipitated a call for
more competition to the monopolist cable companies.
As a result, the FCC initiated an inquiry in 1987 to
determine whether there was still a need for the
cable-telco cross-ownership restriction. 22 The imme-
diate result was a tentative conclusion that, although
telcos
continue to have the ability to engage in anticompetitive
conduct towards cable operators, these concerns no longer
justify the ban because of the growth and success of the
cable industry since 1970 and because nonstructural safe-
guards are available which would allow the public to re-
ceive the benefits of cross-ownership between telephone
companies and cable systems while preventing carrier an-
ticompetitive conduct. 23
The Commission, however, made no recommenda-
tion at the time to lift the restriction. It merely solic-
ited comments on the tentative conclusion "for the
purpose of developing the fullest possible record on
which to base legislative recommendations to Con-
gress." '24 Since that time, the Commission has fo-
cused on video dialtone as a competitor to cable.
The concept of video dialtone was developed by
the U.S. Department of Commerce's National Tele-
communications and Information Administration
("NTIA") during former FCC Chairman Alfred
Sikes' tenure as NTIA Administrator.25 At that
'8 In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commis-
sion's Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Ser-
vice, Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 4962, para. 73 (1990).
'9 Id. at 5106 Table I.
20 Id. para. 78.
21 Id. paras. 79-80.
22 In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Own-
ership Rules, Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 5092 (1987).
" In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Own-
ership Rules, Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 3 FCC Rcd. 5849, para. 10 (1988).
24 Id. para. 1.
25 See NTIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 32-60.
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time, NTIA concluded that telcos should continue to
provide only the conduit-not the content-for video
programming."6 Under Sikes, the NTIA established
the goal of making cable service available to un-
served areas of the country as well as providing com-
petition to monopolist cable operators.17 To accom-
plish this goal, NTIA turned to the ubiquitous
telephone companies. Local telephone companies
would be the logical means to expand video pro-
gramming delivery because they provided universal
service-they served more than ninety percent of the
nation.28 However, NTIA declined to recommend
telco ownership of programming because of concerns
about the potential for cross-subsidization2" and dis-
crimination against competitors." Instead, the
NTIA, under Sikes, concluded that telcos should
provide only the conduit by which nonaffiliated pro-
grammers could distribute their wares.3"
When Sikes became FCC Chairman in 1989, one
of his priorities was improving the nation's telecom-
munications infrastructure.32 Video dialtone became
part of that effort. The video dialtone concept was
officially presented in the 1991 Decision.3" There,
the FCC declared that the cross-ownership provision
of the Communications Act did not apply to inter-
exchange (i.e., long-distance) carriers because they
had no control over local exchange facilities.3 4 The
Commission also ruled that the cable franchising
provisions of section 621 of the Communications Act
did not apply to telcos providing common carrier
video dialtone services or programmers desiring to
connect to telcos' systems."5 Fearing that cable com-
panies that had to obtain a franchise from local au-
thorities before beginning construction would be
placed at a disadvantage, cable interests have sought
court review of the franchising decision.36
The FCC based its franchising conclusion on an
interesting premise: a video dialtone system would
26 Id. at 54-58.
27 Id. at 32.
28 As of March 1992, 93.9 percent of the nation's households
were telephone subscribers. See INDUSTRY ANALYSIS Div.,
FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, Table I at 2 (Sept.
1992).
2 NTIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 51.
20 Id. at 54.
21 Id. at 36.
12 See Statement of Alfred C. Sikes, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission, on FCC 1990-91 Re-Authoriza-
tion Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Repre-
sentatives, September 14, 1989.
" See 1991 Decision, supra note 3.
not be cable service as defined by the Cable Act (i.e.,
one-way transmission of programming with sub-
scriber interaction necessary to select the program-
ming)"7 because, with video dialtone, the telco would
only provide the conduit for program delivery. 8 It
would not own, control or provide the programming
carried over its lines. Therefore, according to the
Commission, telcos would not be characterized as
cable operators subject to the franchising provision. 9
This is a fundamentally shaky argument because
some video dialtone services might indeed be one-
way transmissions with the telco providing merely a
means for subscriber interaction. In addition, provid-
ing programming is only part of the definition of
"cable operator." A cable operator can also be any-
one who "is responsible for, through any arrange-
ment, the management and operation of such a cable
system."40 Because a telco would be responsible for
the management and operation of a system which
provides one-way transmission of video program-
ming, arguably it could be deemed a cable operator.
Perhaps a better position, merely touched upon in a
footnote in the 1991 Decision,41 is that video dialtone
does not fit the Cable Act's definition of cable sys-
tem, i.e., "a facility, consisting of a set of closed
transmission paths .... -42 Because of its com-
mon carrier nature, a video dialtone system would
not have closed transmission paths. Instead, it would
consist of open transmission paths available on a
non-discriminatory basis to all wishing to use it.
The FCC missed a second opportunity to recog-
nize a structural distinction between video dialtone
and cable systems in its Reconsideration Order.3
The Commission described video dialtone in that
document as common carriage, but did not specifi-
cally distinguish the structural differences between
video dialtone and cable systems.44 Instead, the Com-
mission focused on the definition of transmission and
I d. paras. 44-46.
3 Id. paras. 50-52.
3 See National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, No. 91-
1649 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 26, 1991); Community Antenna Tel-
evision Ass'n v. FCC, No. 91-1656 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 31,
1991).
31 See 47 U.S.C.S. § 522(6)(A), (B) (1993).
11 1991 Decision, supra note 3, para. 51.
" Id. para. 50.
40 See 47 U.S.C. § 522(4)(B) (1988).
41 1991 Decision, supra note 3, at 326 n.79 (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 522(6), which defines "cable system").
42 See 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (1988).
43 See Reconsideration Order, supra note 3.
44 Id. paras. 22-23.
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the issue of programming generation." Granted,
telcos may provide some enhanced video dialtone ser-
vices on a non-common carrier basis.46 However,
this alone should not undermine a conclusion that
video dialtone is not cable service if such a determi-
nation is based solely on structural differences be-
tween cable and video dialtone systems.
CONDUIT VS. CONTENT: ATTEMPTING
TO PRESERVE COMPETITION
As common carriers, telcos cannot unreasonably
discriminate among their communications customers
"in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, fa-
cilities, or services." 4 This prohibition could be frus-
trated if telcos were allowed to provide content in
competition with their telephone customers.48 Telcos
would have greater incentives to provide their com-
petitors with inadequate connections to the telephone
system or shoddy repair service. Competitors could
even face inordinate delays in the provision of ser-
vice, which could impair or be fatal to their busi-
nesses. For example, in 1991 the Georgia Public
Utilities Commission found that BellSouth had un-
necessarily delayed the provision of a customer's
voice messaging service until it was ready to estab-
lish service in competition with the customer.49
Still, the telcos argue that they need incentives be-
yond common carrier revenues to build video di-
altone systems. Video dialtone will likely be an ex-
pensive proposition. Penn State University
telecommunications professor Richard Taylor has es-
timated that telcos could buy the entire cable indus-
try for less than the cost of the facilities upgrades
necessary to provide video services over the tele-
phone.5" The telcos maintain that the new service
fails to provide adequate justification for the neces-
sary expense in upgrading their facilities.51 The
telcos are concerned that the emerging video dialtone
service will not be immediately attractive to pro-
grammers.52 In essence, the telcos fear that they will
give a party and nobody will come. Thus, they assert
that in order to ensure that the systems will not go
unused, they should be allowed to provide
46 Id. paras. 16-19.
46 See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988).
48 See National Ass'n of Regulatory Utils. Comm'rs v. FCC,
533 F.2d 601, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"' In re Investigation into Southern Bell Provision of
MemoryCall Services, Georgia Public Utilities Commission,
Docket No. 4000-U, decided May 21, 1991.
50 Telco/Cable, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 12, 1993, at 8.
programming.
With the history of telco-related competition
problems as a backdrop, the FCC has moved for-
ward with video dialtone implementation. The Video
Dialtone Decision adopted a two-tiered approach to
regulating video dialtone. 53 The first tier would be
common-carrier based, giving multiple service prov-
iders equal, nondiscriminatory access to the basic
functions necessary to connect them to video dialtone
subscribers.54 Just as telephone users can now access
a wide range of services from a wide variety of
sources, so too could video dialtone customers have
access to an abundant supply of video services from
diverse sources.
The second tier would allow telcos to provide
some video dialtone services in competition with
other providers.55 Telcos could provide services such
as video gateways, which allow consumers to access
video dialtone services; video processing functions,
which would allow subscribers to store programs or
replay portions of programs without a video cassette
recorder; tailored menus, searches or other functions;
billing and collection; order processing; video cus-
tomer premises equipment; and inside wire mainte-
nance.5 6 The FCC adopted no standards regarding
the types of services which must be offered on video
dialtone systems or the actual physical components of
video dialtone systems. These issues will be ad-
dressed on a case-by-case basis, as telcos apply to the
FCC for permission to construct the facilities.
The two-tiered scheme provides a carrot-and-stick
approach to telco involvement in video delivery. The
second, enhanced tier is the carrot in that telcos
would be able to provide services free of the shackles
of common carriage. But telcos that desire to provide
unregulated services (such as video processing or
billing and collection) would first have to provide the
common carrier level on which their competitors
could offer the same services.5" Theoretically, telcos
would not be able to impede competition because of
the nondiscrimination standards of common carriage.
The Commission also stated it would rely on two
common carrier nonstructural safeguards-open net-
work architecture ("ONA") and comparably efficient
"I See Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, para. 122.
52 Id.
11 Id. para. 57.
54 Id. para. 48.
"' Id. para. 12.
56 Id.
17 Id. para. 60.
I Id. para. 14.
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interconnection ("CEI")-to minimize telco an-
ticompetitive behavior.5" CEI was designed to ensure
that common carriers provide all users with nondis-
criminatory access to basic network services. It re-
quires that information services providers be given
the same access to the telephone network as is of-
fered to their telco competitors. ONA extended CEI
principles to the overall design of telco networks.60
Whether CEI and ONA requirements can be
transported into the video dialtone concept in order
to prevent discrimination is questionable. Having
been introduced less than six years ago, these safe-
guard principles are still very young.61 CEI and
ONA have been the constant subject of legal chal-
lenge since their adoption, having been vacated by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
1990.62 The regulations adopted by the Commission
on remand from the Ninth Circuit are again under
review by that same court." The FCC's reliance on
these non-deployed nonstructural safeguards is, to
say the least, misguided.
INCREASING TELCO INVOLVEMENT: A
LESSON IN CREATIVE INTERPRETATION
Even though telcos will be permitted to provide
the numerous aforementioned services, they will re-
main prohibited from generating the content for
video programming within their telephone service
areas. This "content" bar is the cornerstone issue of
the Video Dialtone proceeding. Telcos have argued
that the profits generated through video program-
ming ownership would be necessary to justify the
added expenditures needed to upgrade facilities.64
Telco interests contend that with program owner-
ship, video dialtone could be operational by 2010;
without it, they claim, it could take an extra twenty
years.65
Id. paras. 89-96.
60 See In re Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Oper-
ating Company Safeguards; and Tier 1 Local Exchange Com-
pany Safeguards, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Order, 6
FCC Rcd. 174, paras. 33-40 (1990).
61 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order,
104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986).
62 See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
8' See California v. FCC, No. 90-70083 appeal docketed
(9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1992).
64 See Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, para. 122.
Anthony Gnoffo Jr., The FCC Dials Up the Future,
PHILA. ENQUIRER, July 19, 1992, at Dl, D2.
60 See Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, para. 128.
67 See id. para. 124.
Those who oppose telco ownership of program-
ming, and thus agree with the current statutory ban,
challenge the telco's need to own programming. The
necessity of program ownership has been disputed by
several parties who noted studies and other indica-
tors that maintained video dialtone would be sought
and used by both consumers and programmers. 8
Telcos also argue that the prohibition on program
ownership violates their First Amendment rights.67
However, the courts have consistently held that the
First Amendment rights of monopolists must yield in
order to protect the free speech of others.""
The Commission did provide some relief to telcos
in the Video Dialtone Decision by loosening some of
the restrictions on program ownership. That relief
came in the form of new interpretations of some key
terms in the rules: "control" and "carrier-user rela-
tionship." The definition of "control" is essential to
interpreting the statutory cross-ownership provision
because a telco does not violate the provision if it
does not control the entity providing video program-
ming over its system. In addition, Note 1(a) to for-
mer section 63.54(b) of the FCC's rules allowed only
carrier-user relationships between telcos and their
video programmer customers.6" Therefore, telcos
could only provide transmission facilities and other
common carriage services.
Specifically, the Commission raised from one per-
cent to five percent the cognizable interest which a
telco could have in a video programmer. ° This
meant that a telco which owned less than five per-
cent of a video programmer would not be deemed to
be in control of the programmer.71 The FCC also
permitted telcos to go beyond the "carrier-user rela-
tionship" with any video dialtone customer or an en-
tity sharing the telco's video dialtone infrastructure.7 2
Thus, in addition to owning up to five percent of a
video programmer, a telco could finance 100 percent
's See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945) (holding application of Sherman Act to newspapers not
First Amendment violation); United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (court determined there is the
possibility of First Amendment problems if movie producers
jointly blocked access to films); Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (finding injunction under Sherman
Act not a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment).
See also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525,
585-86 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 900
F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990).
69 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(b).
70 See Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, paras. 35-36.
71 Id.
71 Id. paras. 22-31.
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of the programmer's operation if the programmer
were a customer of the telco's video dialtone sys-
tem."h The telco could also enter into a management
agreement with the programmer, and jointly venture
with the programmer in non-programming aspects of
the video dialtone operation, such as the manufac-
ture and distribution of customer premises equip-
ment. 4 The two new provisions combine to give a
telco nearly the same rights as a cable operator.
In addition, the FCC took a dangerous step to-
ward merging telephone and cable monopolies. The
Commission permitted telcos to have all the afore-
mentioned relationships with any entity sharing the
construction and/or operation of the basic tier."
Thus, a telco could own up to five percent of, finance
all or part of, and enter into other joint ventures
with local cable operators who shared the video di-
altone facilities. By expanding the definitions of
"control" and "carrier-user relationship," the FCC
has therefore attempted to circumvent the cross-own-
ership provision of the Communications Act.
By virtue of being in control of the distribution
conduit as well as being capable of all those relation-
ships with programmers, telcos will be in a position
to exert tremendous influence over a programmer -
possibly to the point of virtual control. The FCC has
promised to investigate any situation in which this
appears to be occurring.7 6 However, the FCC has
not provided a mechanism for telcos to report inter-
ests in programmers. Thus, the likelihood that the
FCC could, on its own, discover telco control over a
programmer is marginal at best. The programming
ownership provision of the Video Dialtone Decision
is already under review in several courts. 7 Until
that issue is resolved, telcos will likely be hesitant to
proceed with large-scale construction of video di-
altone systems.
CALLING CONGRESS TO ACTION
The FCC stopped short of allowing telcos to own
"' Id. para. 31.
74 Id.
75 Id.
" Id. para. 36.
7 See Mankato Citizens Tel. Co. v. FCC, No. 92-1404
(D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 1992); Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co., Inc. v.
FCC, No. 92-1406 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 1992); National Cable
Television Ass'n v. FCC, No. 92-1530 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct.
1992); Community Antenna Television Ass'n v. FCC, No. 92-
1539 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 1992). On November 17, 1992 the
D.C. Circuit granted a motion to voluntarily dismiss National
Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, No. 92-1530 and consolidated
the other cases and designated Mankato Citizens Tel. Co. v.
the types of video programming services that have
come into existence since 1984.78 Several telephone
interests argued to the Commission that Congress, in
passing the 1984 Cable Act, had intended the term
"video programming" to mean programming similar
to that provided by television broadcast stations in
1984. Therefore, they contend post-1984 innovative
video dialtone services fell outside of the definition.
Specifically, the telcos were referring to video-on-
demand.
The telcos' arguments were strained. In barring
telcos from providing their subscribers with video
programming "similar to that provided by broadcast
television stations" in 1984, Congress drew a distinc-
tion between programming and other services which
television stations might offer.7 9 For example, telcos
are free to provide teletext, an information service
using computer-generated text and/or graphics.80
The FCC followed Congress' reasoning in delineat-
ing the telcos' role in video dialtone offerings. The
Commission ruled that telcos may not generate con-
tent if the "service contains severable video images
capable of being provided as independent video pro-
grams comparable to those provided by broadcast
stations in 1984 . ... ,'l Thus, telcos may not pro-
vide content for home shopping services which
merely show products in a given time period and
take orders from subscribers, but may provide con-
tent for video catalogues.82 In addition, telcos may
provide the equipment necessary to interact with ei-
ther service.8 3
Although refusing to go any further in allowing
telco ownership of programming, the Commission
recommended that Congress repeal the 1984 Cable
Act's statutory prohibition on telco-provided video
programming.84 In doing so, the FCC determined
that eliminating the prohibition would lead to in-
creased competition in the video marketplace and
greater diversity of video services, as well as spurring
investment in the telco infrastructure.85 The Com-
mission also concluded that the growth of the cable
FCC, No. 92-1404 as the lead docket.
78 See Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, paras. 66-76.
7 See 130 CONG. REC. S14285 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984)
(Statement by Senator Robert Packwood, Chairman of the Sen-
ate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation).
80 See Teletext Transmission, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1309 (1983).
81 Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, para. 74.
82 Id. para. 76.
83 Id. paras. 75-77.
84 Id. paras. 135-43.
" Id. para. 135.
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industry had lessened the risk of anticompetitive be-
havior by telcos.86
Despite its claim that it had reduced the risk of
anti-competitive behavior, the Commission recom-
mended to Congress that it impose anti-competitive
safeguards, including a requirement that telcos pro-
vide video programming through a separate subsidi-
ary and on the same video dialtone platform that
provides service to multiple programmers." The
Commission also recommended that the number of
channels telcos could program be limited to a speci-
fied percentage of overall channel capacity."
The implementation and effectiveness of each of
these safeguards is suspect. First, the requirement
that a telco provide programming through a separate
subsidiary is contingent upon a Commission finding
that such a requirement's benefits outweigh its
costs.89 This finding may already be a foregone con-
clusion. The Commission has stated that "any re-
maining risk of anticompetitive conduct by the local
telephone companies is outweighed by the potential
public interest benefits their entry [into video pro-
gramming] would bring."90 The Commission ap-
pears to have determined that the separate subsidiary
requirement is not in the public interest.
Second, although telcos would be required to offer
their video programming on a common carrier basis,
there are means by which telcos could mask their
discrimination against competitors. A federal court
recently determined that some companies in the air-
line industry engaged in anticompetitive activities in
connection with the display of flight information on
computer services provided to travel agents.9 ' The
court found that the airlines engaged in a practice
known as "display biasing," whereby the flights of
one airline were always displayed first on the travel
agents' computers. Competing airlines' flight infor-
mation was oftentimes difficult to access since agents
were forced to scroll past numerous flight entries in
order to reach the information.92 Thus, the court
maintained that consumer choices were not made
solely on the merits of a particular flight, and the
value of the preferred airline's flights was artificially
inflated. 3 Display biasing, the court found, resulted
in a fraud upon the consumer and an unreasonable
89 Id. para. 137.
87 Id.
" Id. para. 135.
9 Computer III Remand Proceedings, supra note 60, paras.
33-40.
SVideo Diatone Decision, supra note 1, para. 138.
91 In re Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust
Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
restriction on competition. 4 Similarly, telcos could
engage in display biasing by having their own ser-
vices listed first on video dialtone menus or access
directories, making it more difficult for consumers to
access competitors' services.
A third problem with the recommended safe-
guards is that limiting the number of channels a
telco could program to a percentage of overall capac-
ity could be an exercise in futility. By the very na-
ture of video dialtone systems there would be no
"channel capacity" as typically exists in cable sys-
tems. Instead, in video dialtone, consumers would be
capable of accessing numerous video services at a
given moment. Because subscribers would be able to
choose among a virtually infinite number of pro-
gramming sources, and because it is impossible to
calculate a percentage of infinity, the channel capac-
ity safeguard is effectively meaningless.
In addition to the aforementioned problems, lifting
the video programming restriction could actually im-
pede development of video dialtone systems. Section
613(b) is the only provision in the Communications
Act preventing telephone companies from operating
cable systems in their respective telephone service ar-
eas. Eliminating that restriction, with no substitute
ban in place to deal with telco delivery of cable ser-
vice, would give telcos the power to purchase cable
systems within their telephone service areas - some-
thing the FCC has already determined to be of "no
public gain."95 With the ability to own cable sys-
tems, telcos would have no incentive to construct
video dialtone systems. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion has prohibited telcos from converting cable sys-
tems in their respective telephone service areas into
video dialtone on the theory that cable systems pro-
vide the most likely competition to telcos for the local
exchange market.96 The Video Dialtone Decision did
not recommend imposing a statutory restriction on
telco-provided cable service.
The recently enacted Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 has elimi-
nated some of the need for telco ownership of pro-
gramming ("Cable Act of 1992"). 7 The telcos have
contended that vertical integration between MSOs
and cable programmers would keep the most popu-
82 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1474.
9 1991 Decision, supra note 3, para. 17.
9 Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, para. 109.




lar programming services off video dialtone. 8 After
all, it would not be in an MSO's best interests to
have its own programming available on a competing
video dialtone system. However, section 12 of the
new cable law prevents cable programmers from en-
tering into exclusive agreements with cable operators
for distribution of programming in the cable opera-
tor's market.99 By eliminating exclusive contracts,
this new legislation should increase availability of
the more popular cable programs on video dialtone
systems.
Although Congress has addressed telco entry in
recent years'00 it has yet to ease the restrictions.
However, change may be on the horizon. In Febru-
ary 1993, Representative Edward Markey (D-MA),
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Committee on En-
ergy and Commerce, wrote the FCC concerning sev-
eral telephone-related communications issues.' 01
Markey opposed allowing telcos to purchase existing
cable systems in their telephone service areas because
"it denies the public a meaningful cable competi-
tor."' 02 While noting that the video programming re-
striction has served the public interest, Markey
called for a reexamination of the restriction:
Witnessing the celerity, however, with which alternative
providers of local exchange service are increasingly effec-
tive competitors, as well as the fact that multichannel
video competitors are developing networks that have capa-
bilities which appear virtually indistinguishable from
those of the telephone network, it may be time to reexam-
ine the prohibition on content ownership enacted through
the Cable Act of 1984.10
3
This sentiment was echoed shortly thereafter by Act-
ing FCC Chairman James Quello in a speech at
Fordham University. 0
98 See, e.g., Comments of GTE Service Corporation in CC
Docket No. 87-266, at 18-20 (Feb. 3, 1992); Comments of Bell
Atlantic in CC Docket No. 87-266 (Feb. 3, 1992).
"' Cable Act of 1992, supra note 97.
100 See, e.g., S. 661, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1200,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
101 Letter from Representative Edward Markey, Chairman,
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, to
The Honorable James Quello, Acting Chairman, FCC (Feb. 12,
1993) (on file with the CommLaw Conspectus) [hereinafter
Markey Letter].
"02 Id. at 3.
103 Id. at 4.
THE RURAL EXEMPTION: LETTING
TELCOS RUN WHERE OTHERS REFUSE TO
WALK
One exception to the rule against telco provision
of video programming is in rural areas. When the
FCC adopted the cross-ownership rules in 1970, it
realized that the only practical means of bringing
cable service to some rural areas might be through
telco ownership of the cable system. Hence, the
Commission provided for a waiver policy to allow
cable-telco cross-ownership in rural areas. 10 5 In
1980, the FCC reexamined the issue and found that
the waiver process often needlessly delayed cable
construction in rural areas. Thus, in 1981, it created
a blanket exemption to the cross-ownership rules for
non-urban areas of fewer than 2,500 people.' 0 6 The
exemption was codified in the 1984 Cable Act with-
out a standard. Instead, Congress left standard-set-
ting to the FCC, stating that the prohibition "shall
not apply to any common carrier to the extent such
carrier provides telephone exchange service in any
rural area (as defined by the Commission)."'0
The Commission began a reexamination of the ru-
ral exemption in its 1988 Further Notice of Inquiry,
seeking comment on whether the population stan-
dard should be revised or replaced with another
standard, such as telco size.1"8 Numerous parties ad-
dressed the rural exemption issue in their comments
to the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking por-
tion of the 1991 Decision, thus presenting the Com-
mission with a wide variety of options. 0 9 Even
though cable already exists in 91.2 percent of Ameri-
can households, and is expected to pass 93.2 percent
by 1999, the FCC tentatively concluded that raising
the rural exemption threshold to areas with a popu-
lation of less than 10,000 would help speed cable
service to unserved and underserved areas." 0 The
FCC did not propose a benchmark for what consti-
tutes "underserved," but it noted that stalled or in-
complete cable systems left some areas "under-
104 See Joe Flint, Quello: Free Telcos, Protect Local TV,
BROADCASTING, Feb. 22, 1993, at 11.
100 See Section 214 Certificates, supra note 6, para. 51.
106 In re Elimination of the Cable Telephone Co.-Cable
Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Report and Order, 88
F.C.C.2d 564, para. 36 (1981). See also 47 C.F.R. § 63.58(a)
(1992).
107 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(3) (1988).
"08 See Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Own-
ership Rules, supra note 23, para. 84.
109 See Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, paras. 148-
49.
110 Id. paras. 150-51.
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served," citing an instance where only twenty
percent of a community had received cable service by
the ninth year of a fifteen-year franchise."' The
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking por-
tion of the Video Diatone Decision sought comment
on the proposed 10,000 population standard." 2
An interesting aspect of this tentative conclusion is
that it was based almost entirely on assertions made
in the comments filed by telephone company inter-
ests. Unlike the 1980 proceeding establishing the ru-
ral exemption, the FCC had no independent data to
support its tentative conclusion to raise the threshold.
Instead, the Commission asked parties to supply data
to affirm or rebut the conclusion." 3 In response to
the Second Further Notice, the National Cable Tele-
vision Association submitted an "independent" study
of all communities between 2,500 and 10,000 which
purported to show that there would be minimal pub-
lic interest benefit in raising the standard." 4 On the
other hand, some telephone interests, most notably
GTE Service Corporation, filed data based on
surveys of their own telephone coverage areas." 5
GTE concluded that a 10,000 population benchmark
would be the minimum required to make a cable
venture financially feasible, and it urged the FCC to
adopt higher maximums (up to 25,000) or other cri-
teria (e.g., areas outside Metropolitan Statistical Ar-
eas). This proceeding's comment period ended on
November 12, 1992. No decision had been released
at press time.
The absence of independent data regarding service
in rural areas is due in part to the FCC's absence
from the cable franchising process. Under the de-
regulatory theme of the 1984 Cable Act, the Com-
mission's only franchising functions are to prescribe
regulations giving franchising authorities the power
to regulate basic cable rates". and to set technical
standards which may be required in a franchise." 7
An FCC rule requires annual reporting of commu-
nity and system data,"' but apparently this data has
not been collected since 1987. Thus, the FCC has
had no real method of independently determining the
extent of unserved or underserved parts of the
... Id. para. 151, at 5856 (citing Warren Telephone Com-
pany Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5286 (Common Carrier Bureau
1991)).
112 Id. paras. 150-54.
.. See id. para. 153.
114 See Comments of the National Cable Television Associa-
tion, Inc. in CC Docket No. 87-266 (Oct. 13, 1992).
115 See, e.g., Comments of GTE Service Corp. in CC Docket
No. 87-266 (Oct. 13, 1992).
See 47 U.S.C. § 543(b) (1988).
1 See 47 U.S.C. § 544(e) (1988).
country.
This situation is on the verge of changing. Section
11 of the Cable Act of 1992119 requires the FCC to
establish "reasonable limits" on the number of sub-
scribers an MSO may serve. This will likely cause
the Commission to gather more extensive data on the
communities served by cable.
RESOLVING THE JURISDICTIONAL
PROBLEMS
The Commission proposes to assert exclusive ju-
risdiction over video dialtone services, thereby effec-
tively preempting the authority of state regulators
over any video dialtone service provision.12 The
Commission premises its preemption decision largely
on its interpretation of section 214 of the Communi-
cations Act,121 which the agency contends gives it ex-
clusive jurisdiction over "construction and operation"
of those "facilities" utilized by "local telephone com-
panies" to provide video dialtone service. It further
asserts jurisdictional exclusivity based on a single de-
cision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit that is more than twenty years old. The court in
General Telephone Co. of California v. FCC1 22 rea-
soned that FCC jurisdiction over telco provision of
"channel transmission service and facilities con-
structed to carry TV and FM Radio signals by wire
between a CATV antenna (or microwave received)
and subscribers," was exclusive because the local
telco facility is "an integral component in an indivis-
ible dissemination system which forms an interstate
channel of communication.""' The Court thus gave
the FCC exclusive jurisdiction over cable television
facilities constructed by telcos.
Jurisdiction over telecommunication services and
providers is a joint state/federal system established
under the Communications Act of 1934.124 Section
152(b) of the Act provides a dual regulatory scheme
by which interstate communications are subject to
federal regulation by the FCC, while intrastate com-
munication services generally are regulated solely by
11 47 C.F.R. § 76.403 (1991).
119 See Cable Act of 1992, supra note 97.
120 Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, para. 72.
121 47 U.S.C. § 214 (Supp. 1990).
122 General Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 401
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
121 Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, para. 72 (citing
General Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 401 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
1' 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1988).
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state authorities. Federal preemption of intrastate
communications service regulation by state agencies
is not permitted125 except in situations where the ex-
ercise of authority by state regulators negates the ex-
ercise by the FCC of its own lawful authority over
interstate communications.12 Moreover, in order to
justify preemption of state regulation, the FCC bears
the burden of demonstrating that its preemption is
"narrowly tailored to preempt only such state regu-
lations as would negate valid FCC regulatory
goals."' 12
7
In claiming jurisdiction, the FCC appears merely
to be protecting its desire to ensure unfettered imple-
mentation of video dialtone.
We are aware, however, that video dialtone facilities may
be deployed in varying configurations and that we may
need to address the extent of our jurisdiction depending
upon the particular configuration. We believe, however,
that to delay the adoption of video dialtone until all such
issues are resolved would not serve the public interest, es-
pecially given the uncertain nature of how such facilities
and services will develop.128
State regulators, on the other hand, are concerned
that the FCC cannot adequately protect ratepayers
and other local interests.
Specifically, the States should be allowed to regulate the
allocation of costs between the telcos' regulated telephone
service and cable television services, including the right to
order structural separations where necessary. Also, the
States should be allowed to determine when and if cross-
ownership is permitted depending on local conditions. 2
Although the FCC may claim exclusive jurisdiction
whenever state regulation may thwart a national
policy, 3"' in this instance the jurisdictional claims of
the two governments can be reconciled.''
The Commission's ability to withstand a preemp-
tion attack with regard to video dialtone regulation is
remote. Because the signals which carry data and
voice message traffic over the nation's interstate com-
mon carrier network travel through local (intrastate)
telephone company facilities, the FCC must justify
its preemption of state regulation of video dialtone.
125 Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355
(1986); California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
12 California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1990);
see also National Ass'n of Util. Regulatory Comm'rs v. FCC,
880 F.2d 422, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
127 California, 905 F.2d at 1243 (emphasis in original).
128 Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, para. 73.
12 See Initial Comments of the National Association of Reg-
ulatory Utilities Commissioners in CC Docket No. 87-266 at 3
(Feb. 6, 1992).
130 See, e.g., Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelley, 573 F.2d
Strictly speaking, these facilities are a part of that
"indivisible dissemination system which forms an in-
terstate channel of communication." 132 Video di-
altone signals will traverse the same "interstate
channel." The bifurcated jurisdictional scheme of
section 152(b) repeatedly has been held applicable to
this local component of the "interstate" communica-
tion pathway, 3 ' and the Commission has advanced
no reason to create a separate regulatory regime
purely for video transmission.
The technical factors which led the General Tele-
phone34 court to uphold the FCC's preemption are
clearly distinguishable from the technical factors
presented by the Commission's video dialtone service
proposal. In General Telephone, the telco operated a
coaxial delivery system separate from its local tele-
phone exchange carriage facility. The court held that
the provision of only "local distribution channel ser-
vice to CATV operators transmitting broadcast sig-
nals from another state" to a locally franchised cable
operator, or service on a one-way basis from the
cable operator's headend to subscribers, was subject
to exclusive FCC jurisdiction.' 35 This narrow hold-
ing provides scant support for FCC preemption of a
video dialtone service which would carry voice, data
and other more traditional telephone services, in ad-
dition to video, over one wireline facility. Further-
more, the video dialtone proposal contemplates inter-
active programming services to be offered by
multiple unfranchised operators. Accordingly, video
dialtone services will differ markedly from the trans-
mission activity found subject to exclusive FCC ju-
risdiction in General Telephone.
Full preemption is unwarranted because some, if
not most, video dialtone signals are likely to be intra-
state in character. While the precise nature of all the
programming which may be transmitted over video
dialtone network facilities is not clear, even services
now considered interstate could become intrastate.
For example, some movie distributors might choose
not to offer their programs on a nationwide basis
from a single origination source because the cost of
long distance video transmission might be prohibi-
765 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
131 See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S.
355, 370 (1986).
132 Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, para. 72, (citing
General Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 401 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
13 See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 355.
134 General Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
13 Id. at 393.
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tive. Instead, such distributors may establish a net-
work of multiple local service providers who would
offer a localized video store service exclusively over
local exchange facilities. The programming might be
transmitted by a private carrier to a local provider,
who would store it electronically and then retransmit
it to subscribers. Indeed, such an arrangement may
soon be in the offing-Bell Atlantic has entered into
discussions with Blockbuster, the largest video store
chain in the United States, to provide video-on-de-
mand. 3 6 Of course, federal preemption of state regu-
lation of these purely local and/or regional transmis-
sions is contrary to the bifurcated jurisdictional
scheme of section 152(b).
Finally, from a strictly technological perspective, it
would be extremely costly, if not impossible, to dis-
tinguish between the voice and data traffic which
pass through the local telecommunications platform
and the video programming which would be trans-
ported by way of the same pathway. For example, as
previously mentioned, the Commission has envi-
sioned video dialtone as including "video catalogue"
services that would combine teletext with full-motion
video. 13 7 Under such a scheme, it would be difficult
for accounting or strictly regulatory purposes to dis-
tinguish which portion of programming would be
video, subject only to FCC jurisdiction, as opposed to
data, voice and other services subject to the joint fed-
eral/state regulatory scheme.
Indeed, the Commission points out that with con-
tinued technical developments it will become "in-
creasingly impractical to distinguish between voice,
data, graphics or video transmission."" 38 Accord-
ingly, if the FCC acts to fully preempt video dialtone
services from state regulation, there could be a com-
plete evisceration of the currently bifurcated jurisdic-
tional scheme mandated by the Communications
Act.""9 It is highly unlikely that the courts would
uphold such a result based on the limited preemption
justification presented by the Commission.
1.. Paul Farhi, Blockbuster, Bell Atlantic Discussing 'Video-
on-Demand' Deal, WASH. PosT, Jan. 20, 1993, at G-1.
117 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Video Dialtone Decision, supra note 1, at 5828 n. 232.
119 See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-
Ownership Rules, Request for Reconsideration of the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, CC Docket
No. 87-226 (Oct. 9, 1992).
"' In the Matter of the Application of the Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. (Order and Authorization), File No.
W-P-C-6834, FCC 93-160, adopted March 23, 1993, released
March 25, 1993.
141 Section 214 Applications of New Jersey Bell Tel. Co.
filed with FCC Common Carrier Bureau. Application, W-P-C-
CONCLUSION
The FCC's recent video dialtone actions have set
the stage for telephone companies to compete or
combine with cable systems for local delivery of
video services. Since the Commission's decision in
July 1992, Bell Atlantic has received approval to
build an experimental system to serve 400 of its em-
ployees in the Washington, D.C., area 4° and has
applied to build two operating systems in New
Jersey. 41 NYNEX is considering a joint venture
with Liberty Cable in Manhattan.'42 In addition,
U.S. West has announced plans to begin video di-
altone operations in 1994."'1 Despite these new ven-
tures, widespread implementation of video dialtone is
likely to be at least two decades away.
There are still many obstacles to overcome. Most
immediate are the twenty-two petitions for reconsid-
eration and/or clarification of the Video Dialtone
Decision that were filed during October 1992.144
These petitions were filed by parties from all sides of
the issue: telcos claimed the FCC did not go far
enough in allowing their entry into video program-
ming; broadcast and cable interests argued the Com-
mission went too far; and state regulators were con-
cerned that their role in rate regulation would be
subrogated.
The battle is being fought in the courts as well. In
addition to the review of the franchise decision, cable
and telco interests have challenged the video pro-
gramming decision - again from opposite perspec-
tives. In addition, Bell Atlantic, through two of its
subsidiaries, has challenged the statutory prohibition
of section 533(b) of the Communications Act on
First Amendment grounds.'45 The statute, however,
would seem to pass the O'Brien46 test. It is nar-
rowly tailored, in that it only prohibits telcos from
providing video programming within their telephone
service areas, in order to further a compelling gov-
ernment interest, i.e., ensuring diversity of view-
6838, filed Nov. 16, 1992; Application, W-P-C-6840, filed Dec.
15, 1992.
14" See Bell Atlantic Plans Video-on-Demand Trial Over
Copper Wire, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 22, 1992, at 1-2.
143 U.S. West to Roll Out VDT Network Regionwide be-
ginning in 1994, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 5, 1993, at 1.
144 See Petitions for Reconsideration and Clarification of Ac-
tions in Rulemaking Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,800-01 (Oct.
28, 1992).
145 Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia v. United
States, Civ. A. No. 92-1751 (E.D. Va. filed Dec. 17, 1992)
(challenging as unconstitutional section 533(b) of the Communi-
cations Act).
'46 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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points by preventing a communications monopolist
from extending its monopoly power to other commu-
nications media.
The lawsuit could be rendered moot by Congress
and the FCC. As noted earlier, Representative Mar-
key has expressed an interest in easing the restric-
tion. In addition, the Markey Letter also asked the
FCC to consider implementing many new communi-
cations technologies on a common carrier basis. 4 '
For example, one of the cable industry's responses to
the Video Dialtone Decision has been to step up im-
plementation of compression technology, which al-
lows cable systems to greatly expand their capacity.
TCI has already announced plans for a 500-channel
system in Florida. 4 The Markey Letter indicated
that such expansion, if used to provide two-way ser-
vices in competition with local telephone companies,
should be allowed only on a common carriage ba-
sis. "'49 Such a scheme would eventually lessen telcos'
local exchange monopolies, thus eliminating the need
for the cross-ownership restriction.
Beyond those proceedings, the Regional Bell Op-
erating Companies ("RBOC") - which serve more
than eighty percent of the nation's population -
must overcome restrictions placed on them by the
Modified Final Judgment ("MFJ"), which resulted
in the breakup of the Bell System. 50 Under the
MFJ, the RBOCs were prohibited from owning or
generating content for information services, including
video programming, both within and outside their
telephone service areas. That restriction was lifted
by the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia in July 1991, but that decision has been ap-
pealed.' If the appellate court, or the Supreme
147 Markey Letter, supra note 101, at 2.
148 See Mary Lu Carnevale, Telephone Service Seems on
the Brink of Huge Innovations, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1993, at
Al, A9.
149 Markey Letter, supra note 101, at 2.
... United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F.
Court, reinstates the information services ban, then
the FCC's video programming decision could be ren-
dered moot for these large telephone companies.
Even if the lower court decision is upheld, RBOCs
will be severely limited in their activities due to an
MFJ provision barring the RBOCs from providing
interexchange services.
Another unknown factor will be the importance
the Clinton Administration places on video dialtone.
The composition of the FCC is going to change, and
with that change may come a different agenda. With
Al Sikes-video dialtone's most ardent sup-
porter-gone, video dialtone's future is in question
and it could take a back seat to other programs. Pro-
ponents of video dialtone may be heartened by the
presence of Vice President Al Gore, who has been a
supporter of increased telco involvement in video de-
livery. The Clinton Administration has also prom-
ised to emphasize improving the nation's telecommu-
nications infrastructure, including increased
telephone system capacity. Video dialtone could very
well benefit from this commitment.
There is also the preemption issue. The Commis-
sion, and possibly the courts, will have to confront
the role of state regulators in a video dialtone world.
Although the FCC has claimed exclusive jurisdiction
in that arena, some video services may indeed be
completely local in nature. State regulators, there-
fore, must be accommodated. The future of video di-
altone is as unclear as the structure and concepts of
video dialtone. Unless the legal and practical issues
are resolved, the vision of video dialtone could be-
come little more than a pipedream.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
'5 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308
(D.D.C. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-5263 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
30, 1991).
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